

Project Number: DH-8801

SOCIAL CHOICE REVERSAL PARADOXES

An Interactive Qualifying Project Report

submitted to the Faculty


of the

WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Bachelor of Science

by



Peter K. Harrell

Date: May 22, 1989

Approved:



Professor David L. Housman, Adviser


May 19, 1989

Professor David L. Housman  
Mathematical Sciences Department  
WPI  
Worcester, MA 01609

Dear Professor Housman:

Attached is one copy of the Interactive Qualifying report:  
Social Choice Reversal Paradoxes, Project Number DH 8801.

Sincerely,

  
Peter K. Harrell

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